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Abstract: 
The party political domain of India is replete with a large number of parties representing the tapestry of 
Indian society. Many of them are based in specific regions and states, built around social and linguistic 
identities. While this enhanced the representative character of the parties, it also contributed to varied 
patterns of political competition and unstable governments. The two major national parties – the Congress 
and the Bharatiya Janata Party -- becoming coalitionable heralded an era of coalition governments both at 
the Centre and states, enabling parties to increase their power and their pay-offs. Parties across the political 
spectrum have tended to converge on macro-economic policy, but continue to diverge on social policies 
and larger issues that confront India, such as nation building and secularism. Chronic lack of internal 
democracy coupled with the rise of political corruption and clientelist practices are matters of serious 
concern. A broader view of governance, resisting temptations to concentrate power and pursue personal 
enrichment, would enable parties to deliver policies for a better, more just society. 
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We may deprecate India’s political parties, the way they function and the means party 
leaders adopt to maximize electoral support. We may blame them for the ills we see in 
Indian society and political practice. Such an attitude is not unjustified. Yet we cannot 
ignore the role parties have played in bringing about a massive democratic political 
transformation over the past six decades since independence. This transformation was by 
no means inevitable: most former colonies went through periods of political instability, 
military coups and authoritarian regimes, but India has moved towards legally-based 
democratization. The mediating role political parties have played in bringing about this 
democratic transformation in a relatively peaceful manner, in a short span of time and 
under conditions considered not very conducive to democratic development, cannot be 
underestimated. They have assisted in the consolidation and expansion of democracy, 
popularized the notions of equality, social justice and freedom, and opened doors for 
inclusion, voice and empowerment of the weaker sections of society. Superficially 
political parties may appear to divide people, but parties also attenuate conflict, and show 
the way for people to come together. Thus, the party domain in India is full of intense 
struggle over contentious social and policy issues and also the space in which 
compromise and consensus are hammered out. What is required, therefore, is a critical 
and balanced assessment of parties that takes into account their strengths and 
achievements as well their weaknesses and failings in furthering democracy and 
governance. 
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Political parties in the Western democracies have declined as mass democratic parties in 
recent decades, especially in terms of membership, not to speak of the dissolution of 
communist parties in Europe and Australia. Parties in India, by contrast, continue to be 
vibrant and have millions of members.  The self-reported membership of Indian parties 
ranges from about a million for the Communist Party of India (Marxist) to about 40 
million for the Congress, and more than 100 million for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 
It is true that the average length of party membership or affiliation has become short, as 
party members and supporters shift frequently from one party to the other, depending to a 
large extent on whether a party is in power or not. If we leave aside the strength and 
durability of party attachments, the fact remains that large number of people are willing 
to attach themselves to a party at a given point of time. Parties occupy a central place in 
the collective life and imagination. They are a constant feature in the television and 
electronic media, constituting, along with cinema, the popular culture in India. The huge 
numbers of ordinary people who gather at the meetings of political leaders, either out of 
curiosity to see the leader, liking for the party or out of an expectation of collective and 
individual welfare benefits, provides a testimony to the primacy of political parties to the 
people of India. 
 
Political parties have played a crucial role in effecting social and political transformation, 
but the domain of parties has also undergone tremendous change. In the decades 
following Independence, the plural and federal character of India’s polity quickly 
asserted itself. Within two decades of the first general elections, the dominance of the 
Congress party began to crack. A large number of new parties emerged, and many of 
them became ruling parties at the national or state level or both. In many states, the 
national parties have been marginalized or become adjuncts to their state-based rivals. 
This flux in the party domain and the proliferation of parties has given rise to coalition 
governments, which have become a regular feature of Indian politics since the 1990s. A 
large number of parties have shared power in these coalitions over the years. For instance 
the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government, under Prime Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee, ruled at the Centre from 1999 to 2004 with about 30 different partners. The 
two governments formed by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) also 
drew on the support of more than 10 alliance partners. Thus the ability to secure the 
electoral support of regional and small parties has determined the fate of national parties 
in general elections over the past two decades. The BJP realized this in 1998, while the 
Congress took a few more years to accept the changed reality. In the 2014 Lok Sabha 
(lower house) elections, the BJP under Narendra Modi’s leadership won an absolute 
majority. But it could do so only in alliance with several large and small parties in 
different states. In recognition of this situation, the party has formed a coalition 
government rather than a single-party government. Despite these alliances, the BJP has 
not been able to muster majority support in the Rajya Sabha (upper house), which has left 
the government unable to secure approval of major legislation. It is not certain whether 
the BJP alliance can reach majority-mark on its own by the time its term ends in 2019. 
 
The rapid rise in the effective number of parties, changes in the relative strength of the 
national and regional parties and the political equations between them, the inability of 
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any one party to control the parliament, and the presence of different parties and different 
patterns of party competition in states have impacted the course of India’s 
democratization and governance. The rise of regional parties to power in states and their 
prominent role in the coalition governments at the Centre has brought state-level agendas 
and electoral prospects into play at the national level (see James Manor’s article in this 
collection). In joining and partaking in coalitions, the main consideration for regional 
parties is whether or not such a step will augment their electoral prospects in their home 
states. The article by K.K. Kailash and Balveer Arora in this collection speaks of this 
scenario as a ‘revolving door’ with both spatial and temporal dimensions. These frequent 
shifts in coalition partners indicate that Indian parties are yet to devise norms for sharing 
power and forging durable alliances. 
 
Democratic process has an inherent tendency not only to bring differences into the open 
and polarize people but also to foster moderation, thereby persuading and pushing 
individuals and social groups to gradually move away from extreme positions on issues 
and policies. In the final analysis, the latter would prevail over the former. If that does not 
happen, democracy fails. Such a process can be tortuous and sometimes frustrating. 
Participation in elections, the need to build broad-based electoral support and the 
experience of exercising power in government tend to bring about moderation in political 
parties that begin their life with radical agenda either on the left or on the right. It is 
interesting that observers of Indian politics perceive this phenomenon in different ways: 
some criticize parties such as the CPI(M) and the BJP for obdurately sticking to their 
traditional ideology without being able to adapt to the changing world or showing 
reluctance to moderate. Others accuse the same parties of abandoning their ideology and 
making too many compromises, whereby they lose their special identity and become just 
like any other party. Divergent arguments about the convergence of parties and 
moderation process in India require systematic studies. Whether convergence or 
moderation is a reflection of the maturation of Indian democracy or something to be 
deplored requires consideration. How much policy and programmatic difference is 
required for voters to have a real choice in elections is another question.  
 
Policy space for parties is not unidimensional. Therefore, we cannot judge parties with 
regard to their moderation, compromise or the abandonment of their traditional ideology, 
or conversely their maintenance of extreme positions, by looking at their policies on a 
single dimension. Moderation is also not something that we expect to happen in the short 
term. It is a long-term process, and it is difficult to detect the changes that keep 
happening in the radical parties at the subterranean level that take time to come into open. 
So those who perceive that parties are reluctant to moderate may have to look at the 
multiple dimensions of party policy and practice, rather than merely going by the 
protestations by those on the extremes or occasional rhetoric of the leaders. 
 
Some even deplore parties for becoming so indistinguishable in terms of polices that the 
only choice left for people is one of choosing between Tweedledum and Tweedledee. But 
such a view does not seem to be entirely correct. Parties are divided on several issues and 
policies. We should keep in mind that voters make choices that have far-reaching 
implications for the nature of the state and government. Parties may not differ greatly in 
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respect to macro-economic policy frameworks, but they tend to take divergent positions 
on social policy issues such as reservations or the need for a common civil code. They 
may also differ on the meaning of secularism and how best to realize it, or how to build a 
strong and united India. So, it is possible that parties may converge on certain policy 
dimensions yet differ on others. Sometimes small differences matter in making choices. 
 
For instance, the convergence on economic policy since the introduction of the 
liberalization reforms is a striking pattern. The Congress party, which for a long time 
stood for building a socialistic pattern of society through promoting state-owned 
industries and centralized planning, ushered in the reforms. The socialist parties that had 
voiced opposition to these reforms continued them when they came to power in 1996 as 
the United Front. Communist parties too, which had taken a strident stand opposing these 
policies, participated in the United Front government or supported it from outside. The 
BJP, which had advocated swadeshi and a level playing field for Indian businesses, 
followed a similar set of reform policies when it came to power. 
 
The BJP, which grew in strength on a plank of Hindu cultural nationalism, has relegated 
its demands for the construction of a temple in Ayodhya, a uniform civil code and 
abolition of the special status for the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir to the 
backburner. It has forged alliances with several other parties that have little or no interest 
in this agenda. Similarly, the two major communist parties have long abandoned their 
revolutionary programme of establishing a proletarian state through armed struggle and 
taken to the parliamentary path, as was demonstrated when Indrajit Gupta, the general 
secretary of the Communist Party of India, joined the United Front government at the 
Centre in 1996 as Home Minister. The Communist Party India (Marxist), the more leftist 
of the two parties, ran governments in the states of West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura, and 
played an active role in the formation of party alliances and coalition governments (see 
Hans Löfgren’s article in this collection). It is ironic that the CPM-led government in 
West Bengal faced mass resistance to its industrial land acquisition policies, which 
culminated in its defeat in the 2011 Assembly election. In another article in this special 
issue, Hugo Gorringe analyses how the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) has 
transformed itself from a radical movement party that stayed away from elections into a 
party in the arena of electoral and coalition politics. It has not gained power itself, but it 
has gained wider recognition and access to patronage. This party provides us with another 
example of the moderation process and how radical parties get institutionalized. 
 
But leaders of the ideologically oriented parties face serious dilemmas in their move 
toward moderation. In his article in this collection, Mitra argues that despite the BJP’s 
electoral success the party’s leadership remains ambivalent in its moderation. Given an 
appropriate mix of guaranteed space and the experience of office, he finds a move 
towards moderation by extremist parties is possible but not inevitable. Analyzing the Left 
Front government and the CPI(M) politics in West Bengal, Löfgren considers the 
dilemmas faced by this party due to its participation in parliamentary politics. It 
continued to advocate an alternative model of economic and political development while 
pursuing policies of moderation, constituting what Löfgren terms a ‘deficit in 
imagination’. Ineffective articulation of its actual position as a social-democratic party 
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led to the party’s electoral defeat by an opposition that accused it of abandoning its pro-
poor and proletarian ideology in favour of courting the capitalist class for economic 
development. Similarly, as Gorringe points out, there are people in and with the VCK 
who accuse the leadership of compromise, abandoning the party ideology and principles, 
and turning the party into just like any other party. 
 
Democratic politics has increased the representative character of parties over time. This 
happened in two ways. Many parties that are catchall types in their claim and practice 
have drawn more and more sections of society into the arena of politics, providing 
avenues for the elites from the socially and educationally backward classes to occupy 
leadership positions in party and government. Where this social balancing within a party 
did not keep pace with the pressures bubbling up all over the society, new parties 
emerged in the 1990s and beyond, drawing core leadership and electoral support 
principally from particular castes and other social groups. Leaders successfully worked 
with the available social cleavages to bring the Bahujan Samaj Party, Rashtriya Janata 
Dal, Samajwadi Party, Janata Dal (S), and others to power in key states. In some states 
small parties based on caste support in sub-regions grew in prominence and became 
relevant actors in politics. Some of these parties, while retaining the support of the people 
of a caste as its core, have been able to grow beyond either by successfully appealing for 
support from other castes and communities or building alliances with other parties. The 
journey of the Bahujan Samaj Party from bahujan samaj to sarvajan samaj is an 
example. One positive effect of the rise of the caste-based parties has been to empower 
the hitherto disadvantaged sections of the society, undermine the caste hierarchies and 
concomitant relations of domination, and foreground the notion of social justice. But 
where the support bases are ossified on the basis of caste, tribe and religion, they have led 
to the erection of walls of separation between different social groups. Thus the story of 
caste and identity based parties and politics is a complex one, containing both positive 
and negative aspects. 
 
As the opposition parties in the late 1960s began to threaten the entrenched position of 
the Congress party, it resorted to a populist agenda. Indira Gandhi split the Congress on 
the ostensible plank of steering the country on a socialist path. Among other policy 
initiatives, banks were nationalized to provide credit access to the poor and land ceilings 
were imposed to redistribute surplus land to the landless. She won the 1971 election on 
the slogan of banishing poverty from India. As people increasingly understood the 
importance and implications of their vote, all parties began to outbid each other in their 
search for voter support. Promises of collective and individual welfare benefits in the 
form of subsidized rice, house sites and housing, free or subsidized electricity, bank loans 
on easy terms, etc. became common. Welfare populism was an invention of the Indian 
parties to cope with democracy under the conditions of poverty, social backwardness and 
low economic growth amidst rising aspirations of the people. 
 
Indian parties are weakly institutionalized, as is evident from the frequent splits and 
mergers and the formation of new ones at regular intervals. Furthermore, voters tend to 
shift from one party to the other, as can be seen in the high rates of electoral volatility. 
Consequently, politicians have increasingly turned to monetary incentives to supplement 
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distributions from government programmes to maximize electoral support. Election 
campaigns and vote-gathering have become increasingly expensive, compelling political 
leaders to collect large donations for the party. To secure needed funds, political leaders 
have resorted to the extraction of ‘rent’ by way of making decisions that unduly favour 
business persons. Carolyn Elliott shows how the effort to gain funds both benefitted from 
and stimulated the centralization of party organizations in Andhra Pradesh, leading to a 
system she terms ‘high clientelism’. Manor examines how chief ministers have used 
money in both legitimate and illicit ways to build or even purchase support from political 
notables and coalition partners. However, Manor observes that Indian parties are moving 
beyond clientelism to what he calls ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives as the political leaders 
realize the inadequacy of populism and clientelism to ensure re-election. Elliott 
documents a turn to programmatic politics in Andhra through ‘saturation’ schemes that 
provide benefits to all who are legally eligible, obviating any need for connections. She 
raises, however, the question of whether these are sustainable, given their dependence on 
the electoral calculations of chief ministers. 
 
Leaders and groups who break away from a parent party often proclaim policy 
differences as reasons for leaving the party or forming a new party. But it is difficult to 
disentangle such factors from motivations arising from power calculations and 
personality clashes. Most parties have become centered on one leader who exercises 
absolute control over the party. Only candidates who are trusted by the supreme leader 
can stand as candidates in elections. Leadership succession is often confined to the family 
members of supreme leaders, who see parties as personal fiefs to be bequeathed to their 
children. The rise of unbridled political corruption, concentration of power in a single 
leader, family control over parties, and the succession of sons or daughters to power have 
mutually reinforcing relationships, one contributing to the other. Political power at all 
levels has come to be seen as a source of amassing wealth for the political leaders and 
their coteries. This is one of the reasons for the fierce competition for securing party 
offices and party tickets in elections to the representative bodies. To secure party 
nomination, aspiring candidates are willing to pay huge sums, their followers come to 
fisticuffs in party meetings, and those who appear losing the race threaten with acts of 
self-immolation, hold dharnas in front of leaders’ houses, and vandalize party offices. 
The language of everyday politics has become aggressive, harsh and vituperative. 
Leaders both inside the legislatures and outside abuse their rivals as if they would like to 
finish off the other. 
 
Political corruption, family politics, a lack of internal democracy and concentration of 
power in parties and government are certainly not peculiar to Indian politics. But what 
distinguishes India is that such tendencies are nearly universal and integral to most 
parties. Democratic and stable parties based on clear policies with leadership that is not 
corrupt and see themselves as accountable are the exception. Leaders who break away 
from parent parties due to a lack of internal democracy and autocratic styles of the party 
supremo, or who form new parties with the objective of fostering democratic culture soon 
after they come to power, turn into autocratic leaders with little democracy inside their 
parties. Those who denounce dynastic rule and found new parties have sought to 
perpetuate political power in their families once they ascend to power. Leaders who while 
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in opposition level charges of horrendous political corruption, scandals and amassing 
wealth through foul means against ruling party leaders turn out to be equally corrupt, if 
not more, once they settle down in power. This does not augur well for a developing 
democracy, leading to negative attitudes toward politics and parties. How and why this 
has happened, how far these deplorable features are linked to social structural factors and 
the prevailing political culture, whether these are endemic to Indian politics or features of 
a passing phase require systematic and empirical studies. Prakash Sarangi’s article in this 
collection makes an initial foray in this direction. Sarangi characterizes the 
transformation of Indian politics and political leadership in the latest phase as ‘politics as 
business.’ 
 
That in turn raises the urgent need for political reform. What is required is not to enact 
more and more laws, but to strengthen the existing ones and ensure their enforcement. 
The Election Commission of India (EC), which is constitutionally entrusted with the task 
of conducting general elections, is not in a position to curb election campaign 
expenditures that are many times in excess of the stipulated levels. Parties today are so 
porous that elected representatives move freely from one party to another with great ease, 
despite the constitutional prohibition against legislators elected on one party ticket 
defecting to another. As Manjari Katju argues in this collection, due to the increase in the 
number of parties, the EC needs to play a more effective role in regulating party 
organization and internal structures, patterns of inter-party competition and the conduct 
of election campaigns. However, political parties, whether they be in power or in 
opposition, have a significant impact on the EC’s capacity to play such a role in the 
Indian political system. Parties may not give the EC the space to play these roles unless 
enough pressure is built from below, from the people and from civil society. 
 
In the decades after independence fears were expressed that India may not long survive as 
a democracy given its high levels of poverty, illiteracy and diversity. In the 1970s and 
1980s political scientists and observers expressed apprehension about the viability of 
democratically elected governments: they saw a huge gap between the demands made on 
the system by people who expect the government to take care of their welfare needs, and 
the capacity of the system to meet the groundswell of these demands and aspirations. In 
this view, the rise of expectations among the people and the populist policies of the 
parties made India ungovernable. With the introduction of liberalization reforms in the 
early 1990s the theme of governance occupied a prominent place in the political 
discourse, as well as academic research with an emphasis on the interlinkages between 
democracy, governance and political parties. 
 
Of the multiple meanings of democracy we see two as most illuminating. In a minimalist 
sense democracy is a political arrangement to choose governments through periodic 
elections. Generally we call this liberal democracy. It involves rule-based government 
that administers and regulates relations between individuals according to law. At another 
level, democracy can be understood as an institutional arrangement that promises and 
promotes freedom, equality, justice and dignity of life. This has to happen through civic 
participation in public affairs on a continuous basis. It should ensure not only security for 
the individual, rule of law (treating everyone equal before the law) and rule-based 
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government. It should also provide for the well-being of citizens, including education and 
basic needs, so that citizens can participate in public affairs in a meaningful way and lead 
a life worthy of a citizen. This is a definition espoused by social democrats. When we say 
that democracy is a political arrangement to choose governments, in the contemporary 
world this is tantamount to choosing a ruling party or ruling alliance among the parties 
and alliances that compete for power. Since governments are formed by parties it is 
incumbent on parties to provide rule of law, and strive for the well-being of all citizens. 
Thus, parties are the agencies through which the objective of a democratically elected 
government, namely governance, is realized. It is crucial, therefore, that parties deliver 
governance with a view to promoting democracy and civic well-being. 
 
Governance in its wider meaning is not merely about regulating markets, but also about 
enabling people to lead a life of dignity and satisfaction where they can perform their 
duties and work in an efficient and satisfactory manner; where deprivation and exclusion 
are mitigated; where trust in and legitimacy of governments are enhanced; and where 
leaders combine on a programmatic basis rather than to push their own interests or that of 
their cronies. Governance and democracy are not possible if leaders take a partisan view 
of the issues that confront society and the public, or if they treat their continuation in 
power as an end in itself or indulge in efforts to promote their own interests, such as 
amassing wealth at the expense of public well-being. 
 
There would not seem to be any necessary connection between democratization and 
decline in rule-based governance. Indeed, many studies in India have found that less 
privileged groups are more engaged with politics, and are more dependent on rule-based 
governance than elites with personal connections. Post-clientelist initiatives to 
democratize service provision through the law and public policy instead of partisan 
politics support law-based governance. Governments that distort public policy to serve 
the needs of clientelist elites and disperse resources as patronage are rightfully accused of 
governing poorly. A challenge for India’s party system is to institutionalize policymaking 
processes that are less governed by clientelist perspectives, i.e. to move beyond the realm 
of electoral strategy and into that of expected modes of governance. 
 
This survey of Indian political parties contains lessons for the study of Indian politics, but 
also for the study of democratic politics more generally. India is the world’s largest 
democracy, and Indians constitute about half of the people who live in what Freedom 
House defines as ‘free’ societies. This collection reveals how ‘actually existing 
democracy’ is practiced, which may give advocates of democracy reasons to despair. The 
contributors illustrate how growing political participation has been accompanied by a 
decline in intra-party democracy, and how identities and ideologies have sometimes 
dissuaded extremist parties from gravitating towards the centre of the political spectrum. 
But it is also true that India regularly holds elections, losers leave positions of power with 
the promise that they can try again in the next election, and more leaders from 
underprivileged groups have risen to power. It is understandable that observers of Indian 
politics may be disappointed with what they see, but their disappointment points out the 
great unrealized potential of democracy in India. This collection sheds light on the slow 
9 
 
but steady progress that Indian political parties have made toward realizing that potential 
of crafting democracy in India. 
 
The articles in this special issue were first presented in the International Conference on 
‘Governance, Democracy and Political Parties’ (1–3 December 2012) held at University 
of Hyderabad as part of collaborative research effort between Deakin University 
(Australia) and the University of Hyderabad. The conference was funded by Deakin 
University and the Indian Council of Social Science Research. Revised versions of the 
conference papers were presented at a subsequent seminar held in November 2013. Hans 
Löfgren, Associate Professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin 
University, was the driving force behind these events. He had a great fascination for 
Indian culture, its diversity, its people and its politics with all its contradictions, 
confusion and messiness. Hans appreciated its positive aspects and was amused by its 
colourful side. Unfortunately, he passed away unexpectedly on 13 July 2014. We 
dedicate this collection in fond memory of Hans Löfgren. 
 
